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Beau Davis v. Andrea Ewalefo,  
131 Nev. Adv. Op. 45 (July 02, 2015)1 
 
FAMILY LAW: CHILD CUSTODY & VISITATION OVERSEAS 
 
Summar 
 
On appeal from a child custody decree, the Court found the District Court did not have 
specific findings of fact to support the restriction of travel and visitation outside of the United 
States and its territories. The Court granted en banc reconsideration, reversed and remanded the 
case for further fact finding considerations concerning whether the minor child can safely travel 
overseas for parental visitation.  
 
Background 
 
On appeal from a child custody decree, the appellant, Beau Davis, petitioned the Court 
for reconsideration of an en banc panel decision that restricted his visitation rights with his son, 
E.D. The district court granted Respondent, Andrea Ewalefo, E.D.’s mother, primary physical 
custody, while granting both parents joint legal custody of E.D. The dispute at issue concerns the 
child custody decree granting Davis unsupervised visitation but specifies that visitation cannot 
occur in Africa, where Davis lives, works, and is married to E.D.’s stepmother Marilena Davis. 
The Court noted that both parents are highly educated American citizens, and both with 
significant international ties. Before separating, E.D. traveled to Kenya for vacation to visit 
family, and traveled to Europe with his mother on vacation. 
 
At the time of the evidentiary hearing in the district court, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), where Davis works, was the subject of a U.S. State Department travel warning, 
cautioning against nonessential travel to the DRC. Out of safety concerns, Davis did not propose 
that E.D. visit him and Marilena in the DRC, but rather that his visitation occur in Rwanda or 
Uganda – both countries that neighbor the DRC but have stable governments and resort cities. 
Neither country was or is currently on the U.S. State Department warning list. In fact, Davis 
made proper arrangements with his employer, Texas A&M which does project management 
construction work in the DRC. Texas A&M granted Davis permission to work in one of the 
neighboring countries since his work did not entail hands-on construction.  Ewalefo objected to 
visitation in Rwanda and Uganda on the grounds that neither country is a signatory to the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.  Ewalefo also cited safety 
concerns based on her internet research, but presented no expert proof on contemporary turmoil 
or threats. 
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied Davis permission to have E.D. 
visit him in Africa, refused to grant summer visitation and limited Davis’ visitation to five two-
week blocks of time per year. Without request from either party, the court prohibited either 
parent from traveling with E.D. outside of the United States or its territories, absent court order 
or signed consent. These restrictions carried no expiration date, and would last until E.D. reached 
the age of majority. In its ruling, the district court did not explain or make particularized findings 
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as to why the international travel and visitation restrictions imposed were in the best interest of 
the child. The court found that both parents were capable and fit to parent, no signs of abuse 
were present, E.D. was capable and has already traveled to Africa in the past, nothing suggests 
anything but a healthy relationship exists between E.D. and Davis, there was no evidence of 
domestic violence, and no evidence of a parental abduction. As far Africa, the court made only 
the cryptic findings that “I should note that the world is a dangerous place as we’ve learned even 
in the United States terrorism can occur, that the proposed countries are not Hague signatories 
nor Hague compliant.” It did not offer any findings to justify its larger prohibition on 
international travel for E.D. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The Court began its discussion by addressing the District Court’s “broad discretionary 
power” in determining child custody, including visitation. The Court, however, found the decree 
in this case deficient in many regards. First, the decrees does not explicitly address the best 
interest of E.D. Second, it does not include findings of fact to support its implicit conclusion that 
E.D.’s best interest is served by forbidding visitation in Africa or travel outside the U.S. or its 
territories absent a written agreement or a court order. These deficiencies violate Nevada law 
which requires express findings as to the best interest of the child in custody and visitation 
matters.2  
 
The Court found the decree deficient because the decree does not give a factual basis for 
denying Davis’ request for visitation in Africa, much less on its ban on E.D. traveling anywhere 
outside of the United States and its territories. Additionally, the decree does not address whether 
visitation in Africa would or would not be in E.D.’s best interest or explain why it is not in 
E.D.’s best interest for Davis to be able to exercise visitation even during one of the two-week 
visitation periods allotted to him, outside the U.S. The decree also did not address parental 
fitness or other factors that could be informative in a custody determination. The Court did not 
find any oral or written observations to explain why the district court ruled as it did, aside from 
the statement “the world is a dangerous place . . . not Hague signatories nor Hague complaint.” 
This reasoning was insufficient to the Court who explained that unless a credible threat exists 
that a parent would abduct or refuse to return a child, courts have declined to adopt a bright line 
rule prohibition out-of-country visitation by a parent whose country has not adopted the Hague 
Convention or executed an extradition treaty with the United States.3  
 
 The Court went on to explain that Nevada has adopted the Uniform Child Abduction 
Prevent Act, NRS Chapter 125D, to address concerns of child abduction or concealment 
overseas. This Act articulates the factors a district court should consider in making such a 
determination, ranging from providing the other parent with detailed itineraries for the child, to 
the posting of a bond to ensure the child’s return, to complete prohibition on travel outside the 
U.S. However, the Court noted that no evidence of adduction was suggested in the record to 
warrant E.D.’s ban on international visitation.  The Court reversed and remanded as to the 
visitation and travel restrictions imposed in the decree, directing the district court to reopen the 
proceedings to take evidence and make findings concerning whether E.D. may safely visit his 
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father in Rwanda or Uganda, whether it is in the child’s best interest, and if necessary, whether 
abduction prevention measures are appropriate.  
  
 
Dissent: 
 
 The dissent found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Davis’ 
request for prolonged visitation in Africa. The dissent argued that the majority overlooked 
factual considerations the district court took in making its decision including Ewalefo’s belief 
that E.D. would be uncomfortable spending more than three-months at a time in Africa, that 
Davis failed to exercise 50% of his Skype and telephone visitation privileges, and that the district 
court concluded that Ewalefo’s testimony was more credible than Davis’ testimony. The dissent 
found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting international visitation, 
because the district court was tasked with determining if it was in the best interest of the then six-
year-old child to spend three months a year in a foreign country with a father with whom he has 
had limited contact with. Additionally, the dissent noted that the decree allowed for E.D. to 
travel outside the U.S. so long as there was mutual written consent from both parents. 
Considering the low level of conflict between the parties, and Ewalefo’s own testimony that as 
E.D. grows older it may become more appropriate for him to spend extended periods of time 
with Davis, international visitation is still possible. Moreover, the dissent also noted that the 
decree can be modified as the child’s age and circumstances change.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court reversed and remanded as to the visitation and travel restrictions imposed in 
the decree, directing the district court to reopen the proceedings to take evidence and make 
findings concerning whether E.D. may safely visit his father in Rwanda or Uganda, whether it is 
in the child’s best interest, and if necessary, whether abduction prevention measures are 
appropriate.  
 
